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ABSTRACT 
The paper aims at a conceptual contribution to the normative economic analysis of rural de-
velopment (RD) policies. RD is regarded as a problem of interaction between individuals; 
(lacking) structural change or the (missing) integration of externalities are therefore recon-
structed as coordination rather than allocation problems. A social dilemma is taken as the 
paradigmatic core of normative institutional economics: how can potential gains from coop-
eration be realised by way of institutional policy? Starting from a critique of the hitherto 
dominating welfare economics conception, three principles for institutional policy are de-
rived: (1) the realisation of gains from cooperation as the normative, regulative idea, (2) in-
centive-compatible self-regulation as the principle of individual action, and (3) institutional-
ised competition as the institution-related principle. An application to rural credit markets 
demonstrates how these principles can be used to structure institutional policy of RD. 
JEL:  D 63, D 74, Q 18, Q 58. 




STRUKTURWANDEL UND EXTERNALITÄTEN IN DER LANDWIRTSCHAFT: ANSATZPUNKTE FÜR  
EINE NORMATIVE INSTITUTIONENÖKONOMIK DER LÄNDLICHEN ENTWICKLUNG 
Dieser Aufsatz versteht sich als konzeptioneller Beitrag zur normativen ökonomischen Ana-
lyse ländlicher Entwicklungspolitik. Ländliche Entwicklung wird als ein Interaktionsproblem 
von Individuen angesehen; (fehlender) Strukturwandel oder die (Nicht-)Integration von Ex-
ternalitäten werden daher als Koordinations- und nicht als Allokationsprobleme rekonstruiert. 
Ein soziales Dilemma wird als paradigmatischer Kern der normativen Institutionenökonomik 
eingeführt: wie können durch ordnungspolitische Maßnahmen mögliche Kooperationsgewin-
ne realisiert werden? Ausgehend von einer Kritik der bisher dominierenden wohlfahrtsöko-
nomischen Konzeption werden drei institutionenökonomische Politikprinzipien abgeleitet: 
(1) die  Realisierung von Kooperationsgewinnen als normative, regulative Idee, (2)  anreiz-
kompatible Selbststeuerung als handlungsbezogenes Prinzip und (3) institutionalisierter Wett-
bewerb als institutionenbezogenes Prinzip. Eine Anwendung auf ländliche Kreditmärkte 
zeigt, wie diese Prinzipien zur Strukturierung von ländlicher Entwicklungspolitik eingesetzt 
werden können. 
JEL:  D 63, D 74, Q 18, Q 58. 
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 
In recent debates on reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), rural development 
(RD) measures in the framework of the so-called 'second pillar' have figured prominently. A 
further shift away from classical market and price policies under the CAP makes a future ex-
tension of these second pillar RD programmes likely. A methodologically informed investiga-
tion and evaluation of them is therefore of prime interest for policy-makers and must be re-
garded as a most relevant task for the profession of agricultural economists. However, the 
recent shift of attention in government departments also makes new demands on scientific 
policy evaluation.  
Over decades the profession has developed highly sophisticated concepts and models suitable 
for giving quantitative assessments of policy impacts in the area of import tariffs, production 
quotas and commodity price support, in which standard welfare theory forms the cornerstone 
of the argument. Given the new emphasis on RD, the issue has to be raised whether this type 
of analysis is similarly suitable for dealing with the more structurally and environmentally 
oriented policy packages now under public debate. The paper seeks to address the question: 
do agricultural economists have available a theoretical conception that allows them to give 
scientifically grounded policy recommendations on problems of RD? The relevance of this 
question emerges from a perceived rift in the academic landscape dealing with RD issues:
2 on 
the one hand, orthodox approaches based on welfare economics (still) dominate as the funda-
mental point of theoretical reference, at least among economists (for a recent survey cf. 
BULLOCK and SALHOFER 2003). On the other hand, there is a nowadays rapidly expanding 
field of policy analyses, evaluation studies, and debates on the most appropriate RD policy 
instruments, which has been fuelled by the new emphasis on the 'second pillar' of the CAP 
and the huge needs for RD in the course of EU enlargement. These latter studies often abstain 
from any theoretically reflected conception of RD and – in parts dictated by the guidelines of 
legislative bodies – confine themselves to pragmatic evaluation and impact analyses with re-
gard to various aspects (cf. the mid-term evaluations of the Commission’s rural development 
programmes 2000-2006). Attempts to bring these two 'worlds' together usually result in the 
somewhat helpless admission that the relevance of orthodox economic thinking for actual 
policy making on RD is probably small. "The superior alternative to the CAP … would be a 
complete market liberalization and a cessation of all budget payments to the farm sector, 
which are not related to the supply of public goods. … As far as to the final desirability of 
such a fundamental policy reform, … there seems to be in general a relatively broad consen-
sus among analysts. However, the theoretically efficient solution is frequently critizised as 
purely academic since its implementation is unlikely …" (SCHRADER 2000, pp. 22-23). 
Many researchers have therefore given up to base policy advice on a theoretically justifiable 
conception of rational RD policy. Theoretically pre-structured models are of course still 
widely used, but they are not embedded in an encompassing framework that highlights the 
fundamental links of RD policy. It seems clear that a successful policy has to be based on a 
conception that guarantees the consistent targeting of its instruments. On the other hand, there 
will probably never be a framework that performs this task in an ideal way. The question 
                                                 
1    The author is indebted to INGO  PIES for inspiring lectures and instructive discussions and to ANDREAS 
GRAMZOW, JARMILA CURTISS, PETER WEINGARTEN and AXEL WOLZ for helpful comments on an earlier ver-
sion of this paper. The paper is a slightly revised version of a contributed paper prepared for the 87th EAAE-
Seminar "Assessing rural development policies of the CAP" held  in Vienna, Austria, April 21-23, 2004. 
2   This 'rift' is analysed as a general problem in agricultural economics by HAGEDORN (1996, chapter 2). 8   MARTIN PETRICK 
therefore remains whether or not welfare economics is the best of all available theoretical 
alternatives. 
The aim of this paper is to outline a conception that takes up recent developments in institu-
tional and constitutional economics to modify and extend the traditional welfare economic 
approach to normative policy analysis. Although several weaknesses of the orthodox ap-
proach are criticised and hence modified, the power of other theoretical insights of neoclassi-
cal economics is preserved. The general desire is to make the recent literature in institutional 
economics amenable to a normative analysis of RD policies. This is done by the development 
of principles for policy design. These principles do not represent single policy elements or 
even instruments, they should rather demonstrate in a theoretically reflected way the inherent 
link between policy objectives and the conditions of their implementation. As such, they are 
heuristic
3 devices that should instruct policy makers and advisors where and how to look for 
desirable policies. They are also aimed to perform an important role in political discourse: 
principles are abstract abbreviations of more complex justifications. They could therefore be 
called semantic focal points of the political discourse (SUCHANEK 2000, p. 46). 
To make the rather unspecific notion of RD analytically tractable, the paper concentrates on 
the following two core problems to be addressed by an agriculturally oriented RD policy 
(cf. HAGEDORN 2003):  
–  The problem of delayed structural change in agriculture. In a unifying Europe, this 
shows regionally different patterns: In Western Europe, labour-saving technical progress 
and changes of sector-specific price relations have exerted a permanent income pressure 
on farm households over decades. Structural changes in the agricultural sectors domi-
nated by small-scaled family farms have been substantial, but labour productivity and in-
come have continued to lag behind other sectors of the economy. In Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), the fundamental restructuring processes ensuing the transition of a cen-
trally planned to a decentralised market economy have resulted in a more diverse picture 
of agriculture in different countries. However, relatively abrupt changes in ownership and 
organisational forms have been widespread. They resulted in a dualistic agricultural struc-
ture, often characterised by many small-scaled private farms and few large-scale succes-
sors of former collectives or state farms. It is argued, however, that many private farms in 
CEE may be too small and large operators too large to be efficient and stable in the me-
dium run (SARRIS et al. 1999). Various constraints, e.g., with regard to the access to capi-
tal, are made responsible for the apparent lack of adjustment. 
–  The problem of multifunctionality and (positive or negative) environmental externalities 
of agricultural production. In the course of agricultural development after WW-II, in-
creasingly intensive farming activities exerted negative effects on the environment: for 
example, natural resources such as water or air have been used as sinks for excess nutri-
ents, and the appearance of landscapes has changed as a result of large-scale and special-
ised production methods. Awareness of these developments seems to be more pronounced 
in Western Europe. However, it is likely to rise also in CEE as a result of EU legislation. 
Section 2 of the paper examines to what extent the welfare economic approach is a suitable 
conception for the analysis of RD policies. Section 3 presents the frame of an alternative 
'normative institutional economics' of RD. Section 4 attempts an illustration of the power of 
this alternative with regard to rural credit policies. Section 5 concludes. The paper draws 
heavily on research work by a German group consisting of K. HOMANN, I. PIES, A. SUCHANEK, 
and others. Whereas the insights laid down in SUCHANEK (2000) have been of paramount im-
                                                 
3   'heuristic' from Greek 'heuriskein', to find; concerning finding and discovering.    Governing  structural change and externalities in agriculture    9 
portance for the conceptual parts of this paper, its contribution is to make these insights fruit-
ful for RD policy analysis. 
2 WELFARE ECONOMICS – A SUITABLE CONCEPTION TO ASSESS RD POLICIES? 
A closer look at the portfolio of RD instruments now unified under the umbrella of the second 
pillar shows that they have as their central theme the two core problems of the agricultural 
sector as mentioned above, the problem of delayed structural change and the problem of envi-
ronmental externalities of agricultural production.  
With regard to both problem areas, standard welfare theory has offered a less than satisfying 
analytical framework, both when it comes to the explanation and the assessment of real world 
institutions and policies. In particular, the emphasis on optimal resource allocation by market 
forces is unable to rationalise lasting income disparities between sectors. Moreover, by refer-
ring to ubiquitous 'immobilities' and 'market failures', it neglects the institutional dimension of 
RD processes. Hypothetical first-best solutions therefore remain abstract in a negative sense 
and easily result in normativistic or 'nirvana' fallacies when it comes to policy advice.  
Within this chapter, the attempt is made to give a very brief overview of the welfare economic 
approach, highlight its central principles for policy advice, and present a critique of the suit-
ability of this approach for RD policy evaluation. 
2.1  The welfare economics of structural change and externalities in a nutshell 
The welfare economic approach to RD regards the problems of structural change and exter-
nalities in agriculture as problems of suboptimal allocation of scarce resources.
4 The objec-
tive of a welfare-theoretically founded policy is hence to contribute to a more efficient alloca-
tion of resources, following the subsequently explained programme: 
1.  Farming activities involve scarce resources, such as land, labour, capital, but also water or 
the atmosphere to produce other resources, primarily agricultural commodities such as 
wheat or milk, but also, e.g., landscapes or manure. All these resources spend differing 
utility levels in different uses – directly for human nutrition or recreation, or indirectly as 
production factors for other goods or as sinks for waste. The general idea of welfare eco-
nomics is that all resources, including environmental goods, should be used in a way that 
spends the highest level of utility. If this is the case, an optimal allocation of resources is 
achieved. 
2.  How resources are valued exclusively depends on the preferences of the individuals 
within a society, given a certain level of income. The will of the individuals is the only 
standard for normative decisions. On an aggregate level, the Pareto principle is applied to 
ascertain whether an optimal allocation has been achieved. The characteristic of an opti-
mal state is that no individual can be made better off without making anybody else worse 
off. This poses two fundamental problems of information and compensation: individuals 
must be informed that a state is suboptimal, and an individual must be compensated if he 
shall make the resources under his control available to others in a Pareto improving way. 
3.  Both problems are solved by the institutional arrangement of a perfect market. The infor-
mation problem is solved by a system of relative prices, which represent the marginal 
value of all resources. Furthermore, the market arrangement allows individual compensa-
                                                 
4   The following is a summary of the standard approach found in many textbooks, e.g. JUST et al. (1982) or 
HENRICHSMEYER and WITZKE (1991 and 1994) with specific emphasis on agriculture, SIEBERT (1995) with 
specific emphasis on environmental problems. The presentation follows SUCHANEK (2000, pp. 54 et seq.). 10   MARTIN PETRICK 
tion by way of exchange of resources. An equilibrium is achieved if the price of a re-
source equals the individual’s marginal willingness to pay and its opportunity cost. A 
number of conditions must be fulfilled to obtain this result: all resources are traded on 
markets, market participants are price takers, there is perfect competition, markets are suf-
ficiently transparent, there are no entry and exit barriers. 
4.  This framework is taken to reconstruct the problems of RD as a result of failing markets. 
Market failure in the agricultural sector exhibits different patterns (cf. HENRICHSMEYER 
and WITZKE 1995, pp. 58-64, for an overview): in Western Europe, the delays in struc-
tural change and the associated disparities in factor incomes are supposed to be primarily 
due to exit barriers and factor immobilities (e.g., with regard to labour and capital, 
HENRICHSMEYER and WITZKE 1991, pp. 383-388), whereas they might also be due to en-
try barriers in CEE (e.g., with regard to capital and technology, SARRIS et al., 1999). Most 
environmental problems are due to positive or negative externalities, i.e., uncompensated 
resource use. As a consequence of market failure, Pareto improving reallocations of re-
sources are not realised.  
5.  The welfare economic therapy in the form of policy recommendations takes the analytical 
framework of perfect markets serious: unfettered markets guarantee a desirable allocation 
of resources. Any type of intervention should therefore be avoided, except if it supports 
the functioning of markets. External effects should be internalised as far as possible. All 
resources should be allocated via the market mechanism. Where markets do not exist or 
do not function – for example, in the case of externalities or public goods – they should be 
simulated by governmental action. This could mean to correct market outcomes – by a 
Pigou tax, or government supply in the case of public goods – or to create markets by as-
signing property rights – as in the so-called Coase solution. 
6.  In the traditional welfare economic approach, the political implementation of recommen-
dations is commonly not an issue, which implies the assumption of a benevolent dictator 
or a functionally similar agency implementing the 'optimal' policy. Politics and economics 
are regarded as separable entities; political frictions have no impact on the correctness of 
policy recommendations based on welfare economics. Furthermore, since market agents 
are modelled to parametrically adjust to changes in their environment, enforcement of pol-
icy measures is unproblematic. 
The welfare economic approach can hence be summarised as consisting of three basic princi-
ples (SUCHANEK 2000, pp. 65 et seq.): 
–  Optimal resource allocation based on individual preferences as the normative, regulative 
idea. All resources should be used in a way that maximises aggregate social welfare. This 
is the overarching leitmotif of welfare economics, the relevance of which for political ac-
tion is specified further in the following two principles. 
–  The opportunity cost principle as a principle of individual action. Resources should be 
used in a way that minimises their opportunity costs. With regard to tradable goods, 
where market prices signal social opportunity costs, it is the direct consequence of indi-
vidually optimising (='rational') behaviour. With regard to environmental goods the prob-
lem arises that their property rights are imperfectly defined. The principle therefore takes 
the specific form of the 'polluter-pays-principle' (SIEBERT 1995, pp. 160-161): the user of 
resources should be held responsible for the consequences of his activity in terms of so-
cial costs. The imposition of these costs on the individual should in turn induce a socially 
efficient resource use.    Governing  structural change and externalities in agriculture    11 
–  Coordination by equilibrium prices as the institution-related principle. Factual or simu-
lated markets should allocate the resources of the economy, whereby prices are the key 
instruments to coordinate individual action. Prices both inform about the relative scarcity 
of resources and offer an incentive to use the resource in a way that maximises social wel-
fare. This does also hold in a dynamic perspective: changing environments induce chang-
ing price relations, which cause substitution effects and hence structural changes in re-
source use. 
2.2  A critique of welfare economic principles 
In the following, the previously outlined principles of welfare economics are criticised from 
an institutional economics perspective. A constructive extension and modification of these 
principles will be presented in section 3. The arguments raised against the principle of opti-
mal resource allocation are basically that it takes an unreachable ideal as the standard for pol-
icy recommendations and that it neglects to legitimise its measures on the side of the affected 
parties: 
–  A first objection is that the welfare economic approach is not suitable as a guide for pol-
icy formation because its focus on maximal social welfare is unable to structure what is 
feasible in the real-world. The inherent 'top-down-deduction' (SUCHANEK 2000, p. 75) 
compares reality with an idealised first-best. This has been termed a ‘nirvana’-approach 
(DEMSETZ 1969), an unattainable paradise. To base policy recommendations on a first-
best situation leads systematically to normativistic fallacies, i.e. recommendations not 
sufficiently grounded on real-world conditions. As a consequence, deviations from the 
ideal cannot consistently be integrated. It is misleadingly assumed that a central authority 
could realign real-world conditions in such a way that the perfect market is attained – 
even under conditions of permanent change with new and unpredictable events. It is here 
where the critique of HAYEK applies (1945, p. 530, quoted by SUCHANEK 2000, p. 78): 
"To assume all the knowledge to be given to a single mind ... is to assume the problem 
away and to disregard everything that is important and significant in the real world." 
–  It has been a frequent strategy in theory formation to treat situations that divert from the 
first-best as being 'constrained-efficient' or 'second-best', but leave the analytical frame-
work unchanged. As DAHLMAN (1979) has pointed out, a fundamental difficulty arises 
from this logic. If all constraints of the real world are taken as given, a situation can al-
ways be described as Pareto-optimal: "if it exists it must be optimal, and if it does not ex-
ist it is because it is too costly, so that it is optimal too" (DAHLMAN 1979, p. 153). As a 
result, any reasonable benchmark in terms of efficiency or optimality disappears. 
–  Furthermore, the basis of legitimisation and implementation is missing in a welfare theo-
retic approach, as argued by BUCHANAN (for references cf. SUCHANEK 2000, pp. 80-83). 
Strict adherence to the rule that only Pareto superior policies should be implemented 
would lead to total political standstill. Welfare economists therefore recommend policies 
which are associated with net welfare gains, i.e. which would allow a hypothetical com-
pensation of losers by the winners of a policy change (Kaldor-Hicks criterion). This leads 
to a disregard of individual assent. Since agents always have an individual scope of   
action, desirable outcomes cannot directly be enforced. It is therefore necessary to set  
adequate incentives, which require the assent of individuals. This is defined away by any 
hypothetical compensation or policy advice based on 'deadweight loss'. The efficiency 
criterion should therefore be replaced by a consensus criterion. Furthermore, since desir-
able states cannot be enforced due to individual scope of action, policies should concen-
trate on the setting of rules. Hence, not social states but rules should be compared. 12   MARTIN PETRICK 
The critique of the opportunity cost principle concentrates on a too narrow understanding of 
economic activity as mere response and not interaction. Furthermore, the assignment of re-
sponsibility by the polluter-pays principle is questioned: 
–  The opportunity cost principle disregards the social dimension of economic activity, i.e., 
the idea that economic outcomes are the result of interactions between individuals. 
Agents always act in a social context. Institutional arrangements, which are the means to 
coordinate exchange and the realisation of gains from cooperation in this social context, 
must not be neglected in a comprehensive analysis. Due to this neglect, the welfare eco-
nomic approach cannot explain why the market mechanism in the real world does not 
function as theoretically postulated. Immobilities or external effects are simply assumed 
to exist but cannot be consistently explained in the welfare theoretic framework. Follow-
ing COASE (1960), the reasons are sometimes seen in transaction costs, but the nature and 
source of these costs is not analysed further. In short, the institutional preconditions of 
economic activity are not an issue in welfare economic reasoning. A prominent example 
in the debate on structural change in agriculture is the question why farmers apparently 
do not seek an efficient allocation of their production factors and thus accept income 
losses. HAGEDORN (2003) provides an explanation based on transaction cost reasoning. 
–  To assign an individual the responsibility for resource use (as the polluter-pays principle 
postulates) would require that the individual has sufficient control to realise a desirable 
outcome and has an incentive to do so. However, if functioning markets are not existing, 
the 'definition' of polluters and hence the assignment of incentives is an endogenous 
choice. The polluter-pays principle gives no hint how this choice should be made. More-
over, the assignment of a polluter status is to some extent arbitrary, because polluters may 
produce only because their products are demanded by certain consumer groups, who 
therefore might be held responsible as well. Indeed, in agriculture, polluters – e.g., nitrate 
emitters – are rarely punished and the polluter-pays principle seems to be of little rele-
vance for actual policy making. 
The objections raised against the principle of coordination by equilibrium prices are that it 
neglects the institutional dimension of economic activity: 
–  The principle of coordination by equilibrium prices does not take into account the invest-
ment character inherent to any interaction. Individual activity at the same time influences 
current and future conditions of action. It always has investment character, in particular 
with regard to reputation, social capital, or productive institutional structures. These are 
essential elements of exchange that cannot be read off from prices alone. Standards, la-
bels, or hostages are necessary preconditions for exchange if information is asymmetri-
cally distributed and specific investments will only be carried out if their return is inde-
pendent of the price mechanism (WILLIAMSON 1985; cf. also chapter 4 of this paper). It is 
therefore necessary to differentiate under which conditions coordination mechanisms 
complementary or alternative to price coordination are desirable. These complementary 
coordination mechanisms are most important in highly integrated production systems 
such as family farms, where non-price incentives, altruism, and loyalty play important 
roles as well as incentives to maintain the organisational unit over the long run (POLLAK 
1985).  
–  Under which conditions short-term opportunism or long-term stability is socially desir-
able cannot be assessed by the principle of price coordination. Individual rule compliance 
in single cases is almost always suboptimal, because non-compliance allows the acquisi-
tion of rents. In the longer run, however, this may result in losses as a consequence of de-   Governing  structural change and externalities in agriculture    13 
stroyed behavioural expectations or mutual trust, which is the basis of long-term coopera-
tion. Agricultural transition in CEE provides several examples where these aspects had 
significant repercussions on RD. Reputation and trust were shown to be important deter-
minants in access to credit (cf. PETRICK 2004b with regard to Poland). Hold-up problems 
on downstream markets are a further example (GOW and SWINNEN 1998). 
Overall, it follows that welfare economic principles of an overarching policy framework ex-
hibit systematic deficits. It is conceded that mainstream economics allows the sophisticated 
analysis of isolated, individual cases. However, important issues of the institutional dimen-
sion of economic interaction cannot be investigated within the traditional framework. In par-
ticular, the fact that individuals always have discretionary scope of action and that this action 
is embedded in a social context is not sufficiently taken into account on the conceptual level. 
The presentation so far has been in parts simplistic and of course did not do justice to the 
many modifications and extensions of welfare economic reasoning found in the literature. The 
question however remains: is the welfare theoretic approach capable of providing a useful 
guide for the formation of actual RD policies? To what extent can we go beyond a position 
characterised by the following statement by BOHM and RUSSELL (1985, p. 455, quoted in 
SUCHANEK 2000, p. 63): "No general statements can be made about the relative desirability of 
alternative policy instruments once we consider such practical complications as that location 
matters, that monitoring is costly, and that exogenous change occurs in technology, regional 
economies, and natural environmental systems"? 
3 OUTLINE OF A NORMATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF RD 
The aim of this chapter is to show that pragmatic ad-hoc advice without any theoretically jus-
tified concept of a rational RD policy is not the only alternative to welfare economic princi-
ples. It therefore seeks to outline the basis of a normative institutional economics
5 which tack-
les the systematic deficits of welfare economics without throwing overboard its analytical 
strengths. The normative institutional economics proposed in this paper is aimed to provide a 
conceptual contribution to the evaluation of RD processes and policies that takes the afore-
mentioned deficits into account. It attempts to integrate the positive and normative analysis of 
relevant institutional arrangements based on a systematic distinction between actions on the 
one hand and their institutional framework on the other. This implies that moves in the game 
and rules of the game are analysed separately. Whereas, in the positive part of the analysis, 
individual actors are still regarded as rationally optimising agents and the analytical power of 
the rational choice approach is therefore maintained, the normative analysis is strictly based 
on the consent of the involved agents and not on the maximisation of an abstract welfare 
measure. It will be shown that this concept – despite its simple paradigmatic core – allows a 
methodically controlled differentiation to various applications that are of relevance for RD 
policy. The critique of welfarism as presented in the previous section shall therefore be com-
plemented by a constructive extension of welfare economic principles. 
In a first step, RD problems are reconstructed as interaction problems. The core of normative 
institutional economics is then presented: the management of social dilemma situations. 
Based on this core, three alternative principles for policy making are developed. 
                                                 
5   The term 'normative institutional economics' is taken from PIES (1993). 14   MARTIN PETRICK 
3.1  Structural change and environmental externalities as interaction problems 
In the following, RD is regarded as a problem of interaction between individuals. It is hy-
pothesised that all relevant problem areas in RD can more usefully be reconstructed as coor-
dination rather than allocation problems. The approach pursues not less than a change in per-
spective regarding the analysis of RD processes: it aims to replace the (too narrow) perspec-
tive of scarcity and resource allocation by a more encompassing one of conflict and coordina-
tion. The task is to reconstruct (lacking) structural change or the (missing) integration of ex-
ternalities as coordination problems of rational actors. Indeed, as partly already mentioned 
above, several examples come to mind where coordination problems are at the core of struc-
tural change and environmental externalities: 
–  Institutional choice in the organisation of agriculture can be regarded as a problem of 
coordination of management and labour force, where moral hazard and supervision play 
central roles (SCHMITT 1991, 1993; BECKMANN 2000; ALLEN and LUECK 2002). 
–  Coordination problems between different members of the farm family are responsible for 
lasting income disparities compared with other sectors: farmers at the same time are sup-
pliers and users of land, capital and labour. Any factor is dependent on the presence of all 
other factors and cannot be easily removed from the farm-household nexus (HAGEDORN 
1996). 
–  Development of viable downstream sectors is hampered by the possible exploitation of 
specific investments (hold-up) (GOW and SWINNEN 1998). 
–  Farming businesses in CEE cannot be modernised due to lacking access to credit as a  
result of widespread principal-agent relationships between lenders and borrowers 
(PETRICK 1999, 2004a; SWINNEN and GOW 1999). 
–  Agri-environmental problems can be reconstructed as coordination problems of compet-
ing groups of resource users (BAHNER 1996; BROMLEY and HODGE 1990; HAGEDORN 
2002). 
Admittedly, these examples are still somewhat eclectic and a rigorous reconstruction of RD as 
an interaction problem has to await further elaboration. However, they demonstrate that types 
of economic exchange which are of key relevance for RD do occur not only through markets 
and that opportunistic behaviour and transaction costs are relevant. Furthermore, it will be 
shown below that all of them can be integrated into a paradigmatic core of normative institu-
tional economics.  
3.2  The paradigmatic core of normative institutional economics 
Following recent developments in the field of constitutional economics (BRENNAN and 
BUCHANAN 1985; HOMANN and SUCHANEK 2000), a social dilemma situation is taken as the 
fundamental structure of the problem to be analysed. A social dilemma is the paradigmatic 
expression of the question that lies at the heart of any policy: how can potential gains from 
cooperation be realised by way of institutional reform? The approach is based on the funda-
mental insight that gains from cooperation at the same time legitimise institutional reform and 
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Figure 1:   The tragedy of the commons as a typical social dilemma 
Farmer A: 
overgrazing?















Source:   Author’s depiction. 
Figure 1 illustrates a 'classical' case of a social dilemma: the tragedy of the commons. A pas-
ture in common property is used by several farmers. An individual farmer A faces the deci-
sion whether to increase his cattle herd beyond what can be sustainably nourished by the pas-
ture if all farmers increase their herd. His pay-offs are given on the left-hand of each quadrant 
in the matrix, whereas the pay-offs for all other farmers are given on the right-hand. In the 
individually most preferred case, farmer A increases his herd whereas all others do not (quad-
rant II). Vice versa, quadrant III is the most preferred outcome for the other farmers. How-
ever, since each farmer anticipates that the other farmers will overgraze, all increase their 
herd, which results in a Nash equilibrium of low returns for all as indicated by the arrows 
(quadrant I). Had all farmers kept their herds in limits, a Pareto superior outcome for all 
would have been possible (quadrant IV). However, this is not individually rational. 
The conceptual contribution of this simple scheme shall be highlighted as follows: 
–  Rational behaviour of agents prevents a Pareto-superior solution. In contrast to traditional 
'invisible-hand' arguments, individually rational behaviour does not lead to a socially op-
timal outcome. 
–  Actions are mutually dependent. Both common and conflicting interests are existing si-
multaneously. Actors have partial, but not complete control over outcomes. Mutual ad-
vantage can only be realised by way of cooperation, there are unexploited gains from co-
operation. The interaction of behaviour is therefore emphasised. 
–  There is an incentive problem: individual interest conflicts with cooperation and results in 
collective self-damage. There is also an information problem: the other party’s willing-
ness to cooperate is unknown, moral behaviour can therefore be exploited.
6 
–  The exogenous variables in this model are the individual pay-offs, which are hence the 
control variables for policy action. However, policy is no longer guided by the desire to 
simulate perfect markets. It rather aims at the establishment of an (attainable) institutional 
alternative that allows the realisation of gains from cooperation. A comparison with ab-
stract first-best worlds is hence avoided. External effects have no longer to be assigned to 
one particular 'polluter', they are rather regarded as not yet realised gains from coopera-
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tion. These have to be 'internalised' by an alternative institutional arrangement, by way of 
institutional policy. The alternative arrangement could involve a price mechanism, but 
other solutions are also conceivable. 
–  The opportunity of mutual improvement creates a basis for consensus and a common in-
terest in regulation. This means, however, that all parties involved must in fact gain from 
an institutional alternative and can rely on the cooperation of all others. This is the pre-
condition for individual assent, which is a key difference to the welfare economic ap-
proach.  
A natural objection to this concept appears to be that any policy reform produces losers and 
universal assent is therefore never attainable. To solve this dilemma it is necessary to look at 
a sequence of policy reforms that is guided by a general procedure which in turn finds the 
assent of all individuals. This general procedure is established by a system of institutions, a 
constitution. Subject to this constitution, individuals will be willing to agree to decision pro-
cedures that are not based on universal assent. The reason is that it would be too costly for 
any individual to find consensus in every single case. Consensus is the normative idea which 
nevertheless may imply that 'sub-constitutional' decisions are made by majority vote or other 
decision rules (HOMANN and SUCHANEK 2000, pp. 194-197). 
A major strength of the normative institutional economics presented here is that it allows to 
shed new light on the role of competition as a key institutional arrangement. Individuals com-
pete over the acquisition of scarce resources, which suggests a situation of conflict between 
rivals, but it also offers the opportunity to engage in mutually advantageous exchange with a 
third party. To acquire this advantage, individuals will be willing to expose themselves to the 
pressure of competition, provided that others are forced to do so as well. There is an incentive 
to form a cartel to escape competitive pressure. However, this would imply that gains from 
cooperation cannot be acquired. Market participants will therefore agree to a rule that pre-
vents the establishment of cartels. This is an example where conflict and the establishment of 
a social dilemma situation is desirable to achieve a higher-level societal goal (cf. PIES 2001, 
pp. 155-176). Competition is hence regarded as a way of conflict resolution that can be used – 
under certain conditions – to achieve gains from cooperation. Among the conditions are that 
property rights are defined and enforced, that competition does not lead to disadvantages for 
third parties, and that there is free market entry for those who offer desired goods or services 
on better terms than the current suppliers (SUCHANEK 2000, pp. 126-128). 
Furthermore, the framework allows to reconstruct organisations as forms of cooperation un-
der competitive pressure. As argued above, the realisation of gains from cooperation often 
requires a shelter from price variations, so that expectations concerning mutual behaviour can 
be stabilised. In particular, organisations are means to solve information and incentive prob-
lems. As WILLIAMSON (1985) has argued, organisational choice crucially depends on the fre-
quency of transaction and the level of specific investment involved. Forming organisations is 
socially desirable if gains from cooperation can be realised that would not be acquired other-
wise. 
It should be stressed again that the social dilemma model is used here as a paradigmatic 
scheme. This is a different approach than usually taken in game theory: game theorists ana-
lyse optimal strategies of actors in various, partly highly complex settings. In the present con-
ception, the dilemma structure serves as a means to analyse the rules that govern individual 
behaviour (PIES 2001, pp. 140-155). It thus illuminates the basic problem of social order that    Governing  structural change and externalities in agriculture    17 
cannot be reduced further.
7 It is not an immediately empirical structure, but a theoretical 
framework by which specific empirically observed interactions can be analysed if further spe-
cific details of the situation are taken into account (HOMANN and SUCHANEK 2000, p. 38). 
All of the examples of successful or failed interactions relevant for RD given in section 3.1 
can be reduced to a dilemma situation. The family farm can be regarded as an institutional 
arrangement to overcome the danger of exploitation and opportunism inherent to any dilemma 
situation: "The family farm can be regarded as an organizational solution to the difficulty of 
monitoring and supervising workers who, for technological reasons, cannot be gathered to-
gether in a single location" (POLLAK 1985, p. 591). Furthermore: "Because economic relation-
ships are entwined with significant personal ones, the family commands rewards and sanc-
tions not open to other institutions. Severe misconduct involves not simply the risk of dis-
missal from job but also the risk of ostracism or expulsion from the family, a  penalty drastic 
enough that it is likely to be an effective deterrent to serious malfeasance" (p. 586). Down-
stream sector restructuring will not happen if farmers abstain from  specific investments in, 
say, modernised farm equipment to ensure product quality, if they have to fear that the proc-
essing company does not guarantee to buy their products. Similar problems exist on credit 
markets (see chapter 4 below). The tragedy of the commons example has already illustrated 
the paradigmatic nature of the social dilemma for environmental problems. 
3.3  Principles of RD policies in a normative institutional economics perspective 
Based on the previous considerations, it is now possible to deduce a number of policy princi-
ples that can be regarded as the properties of desirable institutional reforms. Table 1 displays 
them together with their welfare economic counterparts. 
Table 1:  Principles of welfare economics and normative institutional economics 
  Principles of  
welfare economics 
 
Principles of  
normative institutional economics 
normative, regulative idea  Optimal resource allocation  Realisation of  
gains from cooperation 
 
principle of individual  
action 
Opportunity cost principle  Incentive-compatible  
self-regulation 
 




Source:   Modified from SUCHANEK (2000, p. 131). 
This comparison shall also illustrate that normative institutional economics is aiming at an 
extension of the welfare economic approach. Although the realisation of gains from coopera-
tion as the normative idea is also seeking to exploit efficiency improvements, it does not aim 
at an ideal first-best state of affairs. It is rather looking for a better alternative as compared to 
the status quo. What is the better alternative depends on the assent of the affected persons and 
not on an abstract net welfare improvement that balances over individuals. Furthermore, it is 
still assumed that agents behave rationally and optimising, but all incentives are now taken 
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into account – in particular those which arise as a result of interaction constellations or the 
institutional environment. Compatibility with rational behaviour is also regarded as a condi-
tion for successful implementation of policy measures. Finally, competition is an important 
institutional arrangement also in a normative institutional economics view. However, empha-
sis is now laid on the interactive structure of markets which may induce alternative organisa-
tional forms. 
3.3.1  Realisation of gains from cooperation 
Normative institutional economics regards RD problems as societal problems, whereby soci-
ety is understood as a "cooperative venture for mutual advantage ... [that] is typically marked 
by a conflict as well as an identity of interests" (RAWLS 1999, pp. 74, 109). This normative 
idea encompasses four important aspects (SUCHANEK 2000, pp. 133 et seq.): 
–  Successful cooperation requires that the interests of all involved parties are sufficiently 
taken into account. 
–  Any cooperation is characterised by common and conflicting interests. 
–  Cooperation needs to be institutionalised. 
–  The search for gains from cooperation has to start with the status quo. 
Whereas the first aspect appears to be immediately plausible, the second one is often ne-
glected in policy debates. It is instead common practice to refer to moral suasion and to urge 
all involved parties to cooperate ("entrepreneurs should take serious their social obligations", 
"farmers and environmental lobbyists should sit round the table"). This ignores the frequently 
inherent conflicts of interest and inevitably must result in failure. A paradigmatic case is the 
above introduced social dilemma. This scheme highlights the information and incentive prob-
lems of cooperation and underlines the need for institutionalised cooperation. Many important 
forms of cooperation go beyond the common sense "handshake" between individuals. Instead, 
they are embodied in numerous rules, contracts, and institutions – for example, competitive 
markets, certain types of organisations (e.g., cooperatives), but also a functioning court sys-
tem. These institutions are a form of capital, which is also of benefit for possible (short-term) 
losers of policy measures. The approach followed here stresses that short-term losses for a 
group affected by policy reform should be regarded as investment into the institutional capital 
of society. This in turn is of benefit for all affected parties in the longer run. As detailed 
above, it requires that 'nirvana' comparisons are avoided and that policy recommendations 
focus on realistic alternatives. 
3.3.2 Incentive-compatible  self-regulation 
It was stressed above that the discretionary scope of action individuals possess is particularly 
taken into account by a normative institutional economics approach. Therefore, in order to be 
incentive compatible, any policy must be regarded as legitimate by the affected parties. It is 
not a new insight that governments should set the right incentives (although the history of the 
CAP testifies how much trouble this means for governments). However, if incentive setting 
still implies a centralistic top-down approach, local institutional arrangements and governance 
structures are often neglected. Incentives emerging from the social environment of actors are 
then systematically disregarded. "The economic problem of society is thus not merely a prob-
lem of how to allocate 'given' resources ... It is rather a problem of how to secure the best uses 
of resources known to any members of society, for ends, whose relative importance only these 
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knowledge is therefore a plea for local self-regulation, wherever possible. On this level, not 
outcomes but rules are the subject of self-regulation. 
This principle expresses scepticism with regard to any centralism in RD policy making and 
therefore has direct implications for the debate over subsidiarity in EU policy. HAGEDORN 
(2002, p. xviii) has noted: "As far as the environmental programmes are concerned, both 
farmers and the administrative units at the community level usually complain that these meas-
ures are not adjusted to the heterogeneity of ecological conditions and environmental prob-
lems …. In addition, monitoring and supervising these measures has turned out to be more 
difficult than expected. Most of the people involved in these programmes agree that more 
competencies should be shifted to the regional and local level." The chapters of the book pro-
vide various examples what incentive-compatible self-regulation could mean with regard to 
environmental problems in agriculture. 
Similarly, incentive-compatible self-regulation is much more likely to be adhered to in the 
Community Initiative 'Leader' and its successors, which focuses on local groups and their 
potential to valorise indigenous resources by the active participation by the public, voluntary 
and business sectors within the designated territory (cf. RAY 2000). 
The principle of incentive-compatible self-regulation means that measures should be imple-
mented in and not against the interests of the affected individuals. Contrary to the polluter-
pays principle, which assigns (undesired) responsibility to the declared polluter, it is asked 
which advantages for the affected parties arise from a regulation. Possible win-win situations 
in RD include the establishment of natural reserves in agriculturally disadvantaged regions 
and the use of these areas for tourism purposes. 
3.3.3 Institutionalised  competition 
Markets do achieve a highly complex coordination of individual action that could never be 
attained by a central planner. This is also true with regard to problems of structural change 
and environmental externalities. However, as explained above, coordination by equilibrium 
prices alone is regarded as a too narrow understanding of competition. In a normative institu-
tional economics perspective, the market is not seen as a means of resource allocation, but as 
an institutional arrangement to foster desired interactions within society. The decisive charac-
teristic of a market is not the coordination via market prices, but an institutionalised competi-
tion over opportunities to cooperate with potential exchange partners (SUCHANEK 2000, p. 
141). It is this decentralised coordination of individual activity which – given a suitable 
framework – serves the realisation of gains from cooperation by means of incentive-
compatible self-regulation. The idea of 'institutionalised' competition means to enhance desir-
able and to restrict harmful competition. As noted above, desirable competition generally con-
tributes to the realisation of gains from cooperation.  
In the tragedy of the commons example, a suitable way to restrict competition would be to 
assign and enforce private property rights in the pasture. In such a way, competition would be 
restricted and would enable a sustainable utilisation of the pasture. However, private property 
rights are not the only possibility to achieve this goal – various institutional arrangements are 
possible and observable in reality (OSTROM 1990). 
BAHNER (1996) gives an instructive analysis concerning under what conditions cooperation 
between farmers and environmental groups will happen and which institutional arrangements 
are likely to emerge. He argues in the spirit of WILLIAMSON (1985) that this is highly depend-
ent on the technical and institutional characteristics of the 'goods' to be traded, which deter-
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farmers undertake partly irreversible specific investments if they agree to convert their pas-
tures into a natural reserve. They will be only willing to do so if the other side – environ-
mental groups or governments – provide a credible commitment that they will maintain com-
pensatory payments in the future. One such form would be via the land market if environ-
mental groups buy the land that should be extensified. However, other arrangements, such as 
environmental cooperatives, might be more cost effective but can only be realised under spe-
cific preconditions, for example, if social sanctions can be imposed. 
It is true that the formation of market prices in the traditional sense is an important aspect of 
this decentralised coordination. However, the price is only one of several parameters of com-
petition. A higher price might well be compensated by a better quality or reputation. Further-
more, the principle of institutionalised competition can also be applied to branches of society 
that are not 'economic' in the narrow sense, for example to federal states, administrative bod-
ies, non-governmental organisations, research institutes, etc. 
4 AN ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATION: RURAL CREDIT POLICY 
This chapter shall provide an attempt to demonstrate the usefulness of the approach presented 
in the previous sections. It is not the aim to give a detailed policy recommendation concerning 
rural credit policy in the EU. It is rather the heuristic power of the principles of normative 
institutional economics that shall be illustrated. 
Rural credit policy was chosen as a subject of investigation for several reasons:  
–  First, rural credit policy is an important policy area in RD. Investment support measures 
play a major role in the 'second pillar' of the CAP.
8 Various national governments com-
plement this by substantial national credit programmes for agriculture (notably also in the 
new Member States, cf. NETWORK 2004, chapter 8).  
–  Second, credit markets are particularly suitable to demonstrate the interaction character 
of problems. This is due to the inherently inter-temporal nature of credit transactions and 
the specific roles incentives, risks, and information play on these markets.  
–  Third, although credit markets have been a vivid topic in the theoretical literature, norma-
tive assessment based on standard welfare theoretic arguments has proved to be less than 
satisfying and was therefore of little value to inform public policy. 
The following analysis proceeds in three steps: first, the interaction problems on rural credit 
markets are highlighted, second, the question of normative assessment is addressed from a 
traditional, welfare theoretic point of view, and finally, an alternative analysis based on the 
principles of normative institutional economics is presented. 
4.1  Interaction problems on credit markets 
As detailed above, the traditional assumption of economic theory is that markets clear and 
there is no rationing. Any excess demand or supply is eliminated by the 'invisible hand' of the 
price mechanism. This stands opposite to real world observations of, for example, persisting 
unemployment or credit rationing, i.e., a persistent excess supply or demand with no clearing 
by a price mechanism. Although explanations of these phenomena have been sought and pro-
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posed for a long time, only recently did institutional economists seriously call into question 
the general applicability of the standard textbook model to certain types of markets. A central 
feature of the recent credit market literature is the assumption of an asymmetric distribution of 
information between market participants which gives rise to principal-agent-problems (for an 
overview see BAMBERG and SPREMANN, 1987). 
One of the earliest contributions in this line of research was AKERLOF (1970), who demon-
strated the effects of unknown quality of used cars on outcomes of the second-hand automo-
bile market: the fact that there are 'lemons', that is used cars of a poor quality which cannot be 
distinguished from high-quality cars by potential buyers, may lead to a complete breakdown 
of the market. These insights are also of key relevance for the market for credit. It is plausibly 
assumed that lenders have only limited information about the 'quality' of borrowers, that is 
their honesty, reliability, or trustworthiness with regard to the due repayment of the loan. It 
does matter who is the trading partner, and interaction becomes an essential characteristic of 
exchange on this market. It may pay the opportunistic borrower to pretend to be honest, and 
take the money and run after he received the loan. As a result, the lender will think twice 
whom he will grant a credit. In this case, the lender is called the principal, and the borrower is 
the agent, due to the differential information they possess about each other. 
In a general view, this problem can be stated as a one-sided prisoner’s dilemma (RASMUSEN 
1994, pp. 130-131). Under the assumption that the borrower behaves opportunistically and 
defaults after he got the loan, the bank will not be willing to extend a loan, so that no transac-
tion is the Nash equilibrium. A Pareto improvement would be possible if there were institu-
tional arrangements that signal to the lender that the borrower is trustworthy. 
In more detailed analyses, the effects of asymmetric information distribution are often classi-
fied according to the sequence of actions of principal and agent. With regard to credit mar-
kets, there are four key problems a lender must contend with: the lender must (a) ascertain 
what kind of a risk the potential borrower is (the problem of adverse selection), (b) make sure 
she will utilise the loan properly, once made, so that she will be able to repay it (moral haz-
ard), (c) learn how her project really did in case she declares her inability to repay (costly 
state verification), and (d) find methods to force the borrower to repay the loan if she is reluc-
tant to do so (enforcement) (GHATAK and GUINNANE 1999, p. 197). Broadly speaking, lenders 
need to actively sort out borrowers, whereas borrowers have an incentive to signal their qual-
ity because otherwise they may experience excessively high interest rates or may even be 
denied loans. Leading candidates among the mechanisms to overcome the aforementioned 
problems are collateral provision, third-party-guarantees, joint liability, and the borrower’s 
abilities and reputation. However, riskiness of loans, difficulties in overcoming informational 
asymmetries, and high transaction costs will be particularly relevant in underdeveloped rural 
areas (BINSWANGER and ROSENZWEIG 1986).  
Summing up, the introduction of informational asymmetries and enforcement problems un-
dermines the traditional role of the price as the single allocation mechanism. Therefore, non-
price allocation mechanisms such as collateral, but also honesty or reputation come into play. 
Interlinkages between different markets may arise, for which trade credit is an example. New 
sorts of externalities emerge. A whole set of institutions in the area of financial intermediation 
is the response to prevailing informational asymmetries. However, even in the presence of 
such institutions, markets are still unlikely to function perfectly. Some markets, particularly 
those involving risk, will be missing, and many other markets will be thin and thus imper-
fectly competitive. The possibility of credit rationing is one of the ultimate consequences – a 
problem of significant importance in some of the EU’s new Member States (cf. PETRICK 
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4.2  Welfare theoretic assessment of credit market policy 
Governments have often intervened in rural credit markets by offering interest subsidies, pub-
lic grants, public loan guarantees, or a mixture of these. Examples include the CAP RD policy 
itself as well as national programmes in the US, Germany, and many of the new Member 
States of the EU. It is not the place here to discuss the failures of these programmes to reach 
their stated objectives. The standard argument from a welfare economic point of view against 
these programmes is that they bias incentives and therefore lead to a socially suboptimal re-
source allocation. The recommendation is thus to liberalise credit markets and to cease inter-
est subsidies (e.g., HENRICHSMEYER and WITZKE 1994, p. 361). 
It is clear that neither a uniform top-down policy nor a simplistic normative assessment of this 
policy do justice to the manifold institutional dimensions of credit markets outlined above. 
What is of particular interest here is a line of literature showing that credit markets are 'ineffi-
cient', i.e., not Pareto optimal even without any governmentally induced price distortion. As 
soon as information asymmetries are introduced into the models, most of the traditional wel-
fare analytic insights breaks down. As demonstrated by GREENWALD and STIGLITZ (1986), in 
economies with imperfect information, market equilibria are rarely efficient. This implies that 
much of welfare economic reasoning (such as "government intervention on competitive mar-
kets is welfare decreasing" or "unfettered markets are efficient") loses its basic foundation.  
Moreover, once information asymmetries are allowed for, the models do not provide clear-cut 
policy advice anymore. A recent case in point is the interrelatedness of credit rationing and 
underinvestment. From a standard neoclassical perspective, one would assume that, by its 
very name, credit rationing necessarily implies too little investment as compared with a first-
best solution, so that subsidising interest rate could be a reasonable policy option. DE MEZA 
and WEBB (1987; 2000) show that this is in no way the case, since credit rationing may both 
imply too much or too little funding. Whether one or the other applies in a given real-world 
situation is therefore a priori an open question. Compared with the standard welfare argu-
ments usually put forward by trade theorists when it comes to an assessment of border protec-
tion or customs regulation, a welfare economic view on credit markets provides much less 
straightforward guidance. It is no surprise that the basic positions concerning government 
intervention on credit markets are widely varying, as the following two quotes may illustrate: 
"There is a role for the state in financial markets; it is a role motivated by pervasive market 
failures. In most of the rapidly growing economies of East Asia government has taken an ac-
tive role in creating financial institutions, in regulating them, and in directing credit, both in 
ways that enhance the stability of the economy and the solvency of the financial institutions 
and in ways that enhance growth prospects" (STIGLITZ, 1994, p. 50). 
"In summary, there may be good arguments for intervention, and some may be based on mar-
ket failure. But as one unpacks each argument, the realization grows that, given the current 
state of empirical evidence on many relevant questions, it is impossible to be categorial that 
an intervention in the credit market is justified. Empirical work that can speak to these issues 
is the next challenge if the theoretical progress on the operation of rural credit markets is to be 
matched by progress in the policy sphere" (BESLEY, 1994, p. 45). 
It can thus be concluded that welfare economic concepts such as 'market failure' of 'con-
strained efficiency' are of little value for policy formation unless the need for institutional 
policy is explicitly recognised. However, welfare economics gives little guidance how this 
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4.3  Rural credit markets in the view of normative institutional economics 
The questions to be addressed by a normative economics that instructs institutional policy of 
rural credit markets are: 
–  Given the manifold interaction problems present on rural credit markets, how should a 
policy look like that contributes to the realisation of gains from cooperation? 
–  How can such a policy induce incentive-compatible self-regulation? 
–  How is it possible to implement institutionalised competition? 
It seems clear that any effective policy measures must concentrate on the creation and/or 
strengthening of a supportive institutional environment for credit markets. Not outcomes but 
rules have to be addressed. To realise gains from cooperation, the regulation must be in the 
(profit) interests of all relevant parties. It should promote proactive behaviour of affected par-
ties instead of making them victims of regulation. 
Since any realistic advice must start from the status quo, a suggested first step is to look at the 
existing institutional solutions on rural credit markets. As a result of the abovementioned in-
teraction problems, a demand for services or institutions that help to mitigate the negative 
consequences of asymmetric information is likely to emerge. This in turn provides a rationale 
for the existence of financial intermediaries, which are superfluous in a world with perfect 
information. It is possible to reconstruct financial intermediaries as an institutional arrange-
ment to realise gains from cooperation. As may be intuitively plausible, there will be econo-
mies of scale in screening, monitoring, and auditing (as well as in risk diversification), which 
fosters the creation of specialised firms offering these services. In fact, it may be efficient for 
borrowers to form 'information sharing coalitions' in order to signal their quality to investors, 
an argument that can explain the emergence of specialised financial intermediaries (LELAND 
and PYLE 1977). Similarly, they may emerge if it pays individual lenders (or savers) to dele-
gate the monitoring activity to a specialised institution, instead of performing it themselves (a 
case of 'delegated monitoring', DIAMOND 1984). In both cases, the existence of financial in-
termediaries can be reconstructed as a form of self-regulation – which principally legitimises 
its existence. It is the role of the government to strengthen the functioning of these financial 
intermediaries, a point that may be of considerable relevance in CEE where many rural banks 
still suffer from their socialist heritage and await privatisation or restructuring. Government 
activity would involve the prudential regulation of the banking sector without directly inter-
fering with its intermediation tasks, thus a form of 'governmentally regulated private self-
regulation' (SUCHANEK 2000, 190). At the same time, this is a prime example for institutional-
ised competition: governments should create a level playing field for all types of banks and 
not protect and/or subsidise specific sectoral banks, as has been the case in many CEE coun-
tries and is also of relevance, e.g., with regard to the German savings bank sector. 
Given financial intermediaries, there are further specific institutional arrangements that secure 
gains from cooperation. A very common instrument is to make credit extension conditional on 
the provision of collateral. Collateral, essentially a form of hostage in the sense of 
WILLIAMSON (1985), provides an incentive for the borrower to repay the loan. Compared to 
the alternative to get no credit at all, borrowers will agree to this arrangement. In addition, at a 
given interest rate, collateral increases the expected return for the lender, shifts the risk of 
losing the principal from lender to borrower, and has a screening effect on the applicant pool 
(BINSWANGER and ROSENZWEIG 1986). If collateral is used in order to eliminate borrowers 
with riskier projects, credit rationing will disappear.  24   MARTIN PETRICK 
Collateral thus introduces a non-price element into the loan contract. However, this element 
discriminates against those who are unable to provide sufficient suitable assets. It might 
therefore be in the interest of the affected parties to search for alternative institutional ar-
rangements that potentially overcome incentive problems on loan markets.  
Indeed, various arrangements of particular importance for rural areas have been described in 
the literature. They emphasise the role of joint liability, multiperiod effects, or interlinkage of 
credit with other transactions. Many of these have direct implications for policy design in 
CEE (cf. OECD 1999). 
The first category refers to any sort of joint liability, also sometimes called 'social collateral'. 
The basic idea is that the social and economic relationship between the borrower and a third 
person (which may also be a borrower) is utilised to overcome the abundant incentive prob-
lems of giving credit. The third person may simply be an outside guarantor. Alternatively, it 
may be reasonable to form groups of borrowers who are jointly liable and thus have an incen-
tive to monitor each other ('peer monitoring'). This is practised in many developing countries 
(cf. GHATAK and GUINNANE 1999). Moreover, informational advantages of peers rationalise 
the existence of credit cooperatives, which allow a group of otherwise credit-constrained bor-
rowers to raise outside finance (BANERJEE et al. 1994). 
Social sanctions available in credit cooperatives may also provide incentives to sustain long-
term non-opportunistic behaviour of borrowers, which leads to the second category of ar-
rangements stressing the importance of multiperiod effects. The threat of termination of the 
borrower-lender relationship can be used to encourage borrower behaviour that the lender 
finds desirable. Borrowers in turn can develop a reputation for being creditworthy over time, 
which may improve access to funds (DIAMOND 1989). 
A third category of arrangements concern the case where credit exchange is tied to other types 
of transactions, also called 'interlinkage'. The most well-known is the trade-credit interlink-
age, or trade credit in short. Giving credit to trade partners makes private information about 
business activities available to the lender at little costs. Screening and monitoring of potential 
borrowers may thus be greatly facilitated. Furthermore, enforcement of loan repayment may 
be easy by simply deducting it from the goods sold to or through the lender (PETERSEN and 
RAJAN 1997). 
It should be stressed again that the purpose of the principles of normative institutional eco-
nomics is to guide and instruct the concrete situational analysis, and not to deliver cookbook 
recipes. The aim of this section was to underpin the claim that the principles provide a sys-
tematically more appropriate framework for policy advice than welfare theoretic concepts. 
Even so, more specific policy recommendations have to be tailored to the situation at hand. 
Important roles of government in any case will include the provision of sufficient information 
and knowledge regarding the implementation of institutional alternatives as well as the provi-
sion of a suitable juridical framework. 
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The major aim of this paper was to make a conceptual contribution to the economic analysis 
of RD policies. Starting with a critique of the dominating welfare economics conception, a 
more encompassing normative institutional economics was outlined. A social dilemma was 
used as the paradigmatic expression of the question that lies at the heart of any policy: how 
can potential gains from cooperation be realised by way of institutional policy? Three funda-
mental policy principles were derived: (1) the realisation of gains from cooperation as the 
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principle of individual action, and (3) the principle of institutionalised competition as the in-
stitution-related principle. The strengths of this approach are summarised as follows: 
–  Policy recommendations focus on realistic alternatives and not on idealised and unattain-
able first-best solutions. Even so, major insights of welfare economic reasoning – such as 
the social desirability of competition – can be integrated into the paradigmatic core of 
normative institutional economics. 
–  On a conceptual level, policy reform is designed to explicitly seek the assent of all af-
fected parties and therefore is considered to be both legitimate and incentive-compatible. 
–  All relevant individual incentives are taken into account, also those that are due to the 
institutional arrangements in which economic activity takes place. This is particularly 
relevant because individuals always have discretionary scope of action and this action is 
embedded in a social context. 
RD is regarded as a problem of interaction between individuals. It is hypothesised that all 
relevant problem areas in RD can more usefully be reconstructed as coordination rather than 
allocation problems. The approach therefore aims to replace the perspective of scarcity and 
resource allocation by one of conflict and coordination. Examples were given how to recon-
struct (lacking) structural change or the (missing) integration of externalities as coordination 
problems of rational actors.  
An application to rural credit markets demonstrated how the policy principles can be used to 
structure institutional policy of RD. Instead of influencing market outcomes by more or less 
unspecified subsidy payments, it is recommended to create and/or strengthen an institutional 
framework that allows the functioning of financial intermediaries operating in the interest of 
both borrowers and lenders. This would include the prudential regulation of the banking sec-
tor without directly interfering with its intermediation tasks, hence a form of both 'govern-
mentally regulated private self-regulation' and institutionalised competition. This is of par-
ticular relevance for the EU’s new Member States. Furthermore, government policy should 
concentrate on the development and/or adaptation of suitable institutional alternatives to bank 
credit, such as trade credit or joint liability schemes. 
Despite these illustrative examples and although there is now a considerable amount of litera-
ture devoted to this issue, the reconstruction of RD as a problem of interaction certainly de-
serves further elaboration. There is still a considerable way to go toward a systematic assess-
ment of RD policies. This is in particular true with regard to the various aspects of structural 
change in agriculture. However, it already becomes clear that most of the single RD instru-
ments actually in place under the CAP are purely interventionist in the sense that they directly 
address economic outcomes (or moves in the game) without changing the institutional set-up 
(the rules of the game). In light of the approach chosen here, these measures will contribute 
little to the 'healing' of the problems acute in RD, but (at best!) cure the symptoms. On the 
contrary, instruments which encourage the reform of local governance structures and net-
works such as the Community Initiative 'Leader' seem to be much better suited to bring about 
institutional reform that realises gains from cooperation in rural areas. The present approach 
also reinforces the need to design policies that impact on the appropriate administrative level 
and hence includes a plea for consequent subsidiarity. 
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